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Was the outcome in Christian Legal Society (CLS) v. Martinez1 
surprising? The case is situated at the intersection of various, and 
arguably conflicting, lines of doctrine.2 Thus, the result might have 
seemed surprising if one were inclined to place the case alongside the 
series of Supreme Court decisions requiring public schools to grant 
religious groups equal access to public facilities—cases such as 
Widmar v. Vincent,3 Rosenberger v. University of Virginia,4 and Good 
News Club v. Milford Central School.5 It might have seemed to be a 
straightforward application of well-settled law, however, if one 
considered CLS to be yet another in the line of cases holding that, 
when extending benefits, the government may limit the recipients in 
any manner it wishes, so long as it does not improperly discriminate—
cases such as Rust v. Sullivan,6 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and  
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 1. Christian Legal Soc’y (CLS) v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
 2. Id. at 2984–85 (noting that CLS’s claims call on two different lines of doctrine—that 
involving free speech in public fora and that involving the freedom of expressive association). 
 3. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
 4. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 5. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001). Mirroring these cases that 
hold in favor of religious plaintiffs on free-speech grounds, of course, are those cases applying 
limited public forum analysis to reject the claims of non-religious plaintiffs to such fora. E.g., 
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 808 (1984); Perry Educ. Ass’n 
v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 50 (1983). 
 6. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
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Institutional Rights (FAIR),7 and United States v. American Library 
Association.8 
Ultimately, the CLS Court held that all of the relevant doctrines 
supported the position advocated by the Hastings College of Law 
(Hastings). The Court held a school could decline to recognize the 
student chapter of CLS due to the group’s refusal to accept members 
who did not conform their beliefs and conduct to the principles of 
CLS (particularly regarding homosexuality).9 Because Hastings’s 
refusal to recognize the CLS chapter as a registered student 
organization did not directly coerce the group to accept members it 
did not wish to take, the case turned on the question of whether a 
public university could decline to extend its financial support and 
other benefits to particular student groups.10 And because Hastings 
applied a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral “accept-all-comers” policy to 
registered student organizations, the condition passed muster under 
cases such as Rosenberger, which permitted the government to 
exclude speakers from a “limited public forum” so long as it did not 
behave unreasonably or exercise viewpoint discrimination.11 
Perhaps less obviously, however, CLS may also be viewed in 
relation to two other recent Roberts Court cases: Pleasant Grove City 
v. Summum12 and Salazar v. Buono.13 In CLS, as in Summum and 
Buono, the Supreme Court turned to property—both as a metaphor 
and as a doctrinal tool—to resolve difficult and multifaceted 
constitutional questions. Although the relationship between First 
Amendment rights and property rights is a long-standing one,14 the 
 
 7. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47 
(2006). 
 8. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003). See also Brief on the 
Merits for Respondent-Intervenor Hastings Outlaw at 44•49, CLS v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 
(2010) (No. 08-1371). In addition, one might have seen trouble in store for CLS simply based on 
its ultimately catastrophic decision to stipulate that Hastings College of Law had indeed 
adopted an “accept-all-comers” policy. 
 9. CLS, 130 S. Ct. at 2994. 
 10. Id. at 2986. 
 11. Id. at 2988•95. 
 12. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009). 
 13. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010). 
 14. See, e.g., Timothy Zick, Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography, 74 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 439, 444•48 (2006) (describing the relationship between free speech and 
property in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence); Calvin Massey, Public Fora, 
Neutral Governments, and the Prism of Property, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 309, 310 (1999) (discussing 
the Court’s “fundamental error” of “misconceiving the speech issues involved in the public 
forum problem as property issues”); Joseph Blocher, Government Property and Government 
Speech, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
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Court seems to have turned to property with a renewed enthusiasm in 
these three recent cases.15 And although the property framework may 
appear to hold the promise of simplicity, neutrality, and avoidance of 
difficult policy questions, this essay argues that it fails to deliver on 
those promises. Instead, property analysis obscures the complex First 
Amendment issues behind seemingly easy categorical judgments and 
grants the government virtually unlimited power to exclude undesired 
speakers and groups. 
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in CLS turns on the idea that 
Hastings created a “limited public forum” through its Registered 
Student Organization (RSO) program.16 Because the Court found 
that the RSO program carried the limited public forum designation, 
Hastings was permitted to draw lines to determine which student 
groups would have access to the forum, so long as those lines were 
reasonable and did not discriminate against particular groups based 
on their viewpoint.17 The use of forum analysis with respect to CLS’s 
free-speech claim was not particularly unusual or controversial—
though it is perhaps worth noting that the Court recently has shown 
little appetite for forum analysis and has declined to apply it in 
several important cases in the past few years.18 What may be more 
noteworthy is that the Court extended forum analysis to CLS’s 
freedom-of-association claim as well.19 This doctrinal decision was a 
less obvious choice, since the Court could not point to any recent 
cases in which freedom of association claims were assimilated to free-
speech forum analysis. Indeed, the Court was left to distinguish 
 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1653644, at 5 (exploring “the deep structure of the relationship between 
government property and government speech”); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of Public 
Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1965) (surveying free speech in a variety of 
public-place cases). 
 15. It is worth noting, moreover, that there were three different groupings of Justices 
applying the property principles in each of the three cases. CLS was a 5-4 decision with the 
liberal Justices in the majority, and Buono was 5-4 with the conservatives in the majority, Justice 
Kennedy being the swing vote in each case. Summum was a 9-0 decision. This essay therefore 
does not argue that the property approach is unique to any particular wing of the Court or any 
particular Justice. 
 16. CLS, 130 S. Ct. at 2985 (concluding that “[the Court’s] limited-public-forum precedents 
supply the appropriate framework for assessing both CLS’s speech and association rights”). 
 17. Id. at 2989•91. 
 18. The Court declined to apply forum analysis despite at least one party’s urging in Locke 
v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720 n.3 (2004), and United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 
194, 205 (2003); cf. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 189•90 (2007) (mentioning 
but not clearly applying forum analysis with respect to public employees union’s expenditure of 
agency-shop fees). 
 19. CLS, 130 S. Ct. at 2985•86. 
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precedents such as Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and 
Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,20 and Healy v. James,21 in which forum 
doctrine was not applied or even mentioned.22 
By applying forum analysis in CLS, the Court reminded us that 
the government is not just a regulator—it is also a property owner 
that exercises dominion, control, and exclusionary rights over its 
domain. The majority opinion explains that forum analysis recognizes 
the government’s ability “to preserve the property under its control 
for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.”23 Hastings’s decision to 
exclude CLS from its RSO program is based on the law school’s role 
as both a “property owner and [an] educational institution.”24 
The Court’s use of forum doctrine places it in the company of 
Summum and Buono, two other recent cases dealing with the rights of 
religious minorities. In Buono, also decided last term, a National Park 
Service employee challenged the presence on federal land of a Latin 
cross, which had been erected as a memorial to the soldiers who died 
in World War I.25 Shortly before the Buono litigation, the Park Service 
had denied permission to erect a Buddhist shrine in the same 
location.26 The Court held against the cross’s challenger in Buono, 
with a plurality opining that federal legislation, passed after the 
district court found an Establishment Clause violation, had the 
potential to alleviate a previously-adjudicated constitutional violation, 
and, by logical extension, to permit the exclusion of other religious 
monuments by transferring ownership of the cross to a private party.27 
 
 20. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995) 
(holding, without referencing public forum doctrine, that the application of a public 
accommodation law to force a veterans group to allow gay individuals to march in its parade 
violated the group’s First Amendment right of expressive association). 
 21. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (finding a violation of the First Amendment in a 
university’s exclusion of a student group from official recognition without applying forum 
analysis). 
 22. See CLS, 130 S. Ct. at 2986 n.14, 2987 (distinguishing Hurley and Healy); id. at 3007•09 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (asserting that the case is controlled by Healy); cf. John D. Inazu, The 
Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV. 565 (2010) (bemoaning the assimilation of the 
constitutional freedom of assembly to the freedom of expressive association). 
 23. CLS, 130 S. Ct. at 2984 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) 
(internal quotation marks omitted in original)). 
 24. Id. at 2986; cf. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON) v. Lee, 505 U.S. 
672, 678 (1992) (“Where the government is acting as a proprietor, managing its internal 
operations, rather than acting as lawmaker with the power to regulate or license, its action will 
not be subjected to the heightened review to which its actions as a lawmaker may be subject.”). 
 25. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1811•12 (2010). 
 26. Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 549 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 27. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1817•18 (plurality opinion). 
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In Summum, decided in the 2008 term, the Supreme Court 
rejected the free-speech claim of a religious group seeking to have its 
permanent monument displayed alongside the Ten Commandments 
and various, more-obviously secular items in a publicly-owned park 
known as Pioneer Park.28 The Court held that the monuments in the 
park, which were all donated by private parties, were nonetheless the 
government’s own speech, rendering the city immune to claims of 
discriminatory treatment from a free-speech perspective.29 Like CLS, 
both Summum and Buono rely on concepts of property and 
ownership to resolve complex constitutional questions. In all of these 
cases, the Court ultimately resolved the controversy against the 
plaintiffs by placing religious speech into a framework in which the 
speaker, as property owner, has the virtually unlimited right to 
exclude any kind of speech for almost any reason. 
In these three cases, property law and property metaphors appear 
to simplify the task at hand. They seem to magically transform 
complicated constitutional questions into straightforward disputes 
over the property owner’s right to exclude. Property promises a sort 
of glittering neutrality, a way of cutting through the tangled 
complexities of the First Amendment with ancient, tried-and-true 
common law principles. Yet, this appearance is deceptive. Indeed, this 
essay argues that the use of property is problematic when First 
Amendment values are at stake; moreover, property is not as neutral 
a doctrinal tool as the Court appears to believe. Rather, the use of 
property metaphors—and particularly that of the government as 
property owner—empowers the government to exclude unwanted 
speakers, mostly under conditions that the government itself is free to 
define. 
The Court’s use of property in CLS is troubling for several 
reasons. First, the use of property metaphors tends toward categorical 
rules.30 Whereas many issues of religious freedom, religious 
establishment, and free speech depend on delicate balancing and 
context-specific judgments,31 the existence of a property right suggests 
 
 28. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1129•30 (2009). 
 29. Id. at 1134. 
 30. See Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum 
Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1226•35 
(1984) (describing and critiquing the categorical nature of public forum analysis). 
 31. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(“[judgment] must take account of context and consequences”). 
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that no such balancing is required. Once the property right is 
allocated, the property owner is assumed to have an absolute or near-
absolute right to exclude others, for almost any reason at all.32 And 
indeed, in CLS, the only limits on Hastings’s ability to exclude student 
groups from the RSO forum were that the exclusion must be 
reasonable and not a result of viewpoint discrimination—
requirements that the “accept-all-comers” policy easily met. 
Moreover, property rights tend to be self-reinforcing and self-
defining, particularly when the government is the property owner: the 
more the government excludes individuals from its property, the more 
it is entitled to exclude them.33 The nature and boundaries of the 
forum being created by the government are defined in part by how 
much access the government grants to the forum, and to whom. 
Indeed, “the Court has begun to define designated fora in a 
disturbingly circular way, treating the very restrictions under attack as 
conclusively establishing that the forum has not been designated for 
speech in the first place.”34 
The use of the property metaphor therefore allows the 
government to set its own speech boundaries—to define what kind of 
speech is and is not permissible by defining the boundaries of its 
forum.35 This self-defined and categorical property concept may be 
contrasted with the “incompatibility” approach that appeared to be 
gaining ascendancy at one time.36 The incompatibility approach 
assumes that individuals should have free access to government 
 
 32. See Massey, supra note 14, at 326•30 (contrasting the categorical, property-based 
approach to free-speech problems with the more nuanced and speech-protective balancing 
approach). 
 33. The doctrine of adverse possession is an analog of this phenomenon in the private 
property domain: so long as a property owner continues actively to exclude others, she can 
retain ownership of the property and thus her right to exclude, but if she fails for a period of 
time to exclude others, she may lose her property right, and thus her right to exclude. 
 34. Louis Michael Seidman, The Dale Problem: Property and Speech Under the Regulatory 
State, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1541, 1594 (2008). For example, in ISKCON v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 
(1992), the Court pointed to the fact that “public access to air terminals is . . . not infrequently 
restricted” as a factor demonstrating that airports are not public fora. Id. at 682. 
 35. See Seidman, supra note 34, at 1561•62 (arguing that the discretionary nature of 
property rules ultimately undermines the robustness of free-speech protections); cf. Jennifer 
Nedelsky, American Constitutionalism and the Paradox of Private Property, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 241, 264•65 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988) 
(“Property is thus the boundary to governmental power, but it is a boundary government itself 
draws. Through property and its definition by the judiciary, the state creates, and shifts, and 
recreates its own limits.”). 
 36. See Timothy Zick, Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography, 74 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 439, 445•46 (2006) (describing the “compatibility” approach, and its demise). 
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property and asks simply whether their use of the property is 
incompatible with the key intended uses of the property.37 While 
largely asking the same questions as the incompatibility approach, the 
reasonableness inquiry at the center of the limited public forum 
approach almost by definition assumes a much more deferential 
disposition toward the government and its reasons for excluding a 
particular speaker. Thus, the default position of government exclusion 
(exemplified by the CLS Court’s reasonableness and viewpoint-
neutrality standard), rather than of government inclusion 
(exemplified by the incompatibility standard), is not only troubling 
from the perspective of enabling and protecting free speech—it also 
flies directly in the face of free-speech and free-exercise values. The 
claim of groups like CLS is a claim, after all, for inclusion in the polity, 
regardless of their refusal to assimilate to the majority’s political 
views. To start the analysis of CLS’s claim from a default position of 
exclusion is hardly to take those claims seriously.38 
Additionally, the Court’s apparent assumption that property 
provides utter clarity is not entirely accurate. Property has never, in 
reality, been the simple and straightforward doctrinal tool that the 
Court wishes it would be. The pages of many a property casebook 
stand as evidence that the right to exclude others is only a provisional 
starting point for the “bundle of rights” that comprise the notion of 
property. Despite the apparent absolutism with which the right to 
exclude others is sometimes touted as the essential quality of any 
property right, numerous circumstances impose limits on that right to 
exclude. Antidiscrimination laws are one example; the right to free 
speech in parks, streets, and other government-owned property is 
another.39 Indeed, thirty years ago, in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. 
Robins, the Supreme Court upheld the California Supreme Court’s 
decision requiring a private property owner’s right to exclude others 
to yield to the free-speech rights of individuals who would engage in 
peaceful expressive activity on that property.40 In his Pruneyard 
concurrence, Justice Marshall rejected an “overly formalistic view of 
the relationship between the institution of private ownership of 
 
 37. See Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 826•27 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(describing the incompatibility approach); Massey, supra note 14, at 328•29 (same). 
 38. Cf. Inazu, supra note 22, at 570 (describing freedom of assembly in similar terms). 
 39. See, e.g., Kalven, supra note 14, at 13 (influentially describing a “First-Amendment 
easement” to use the public streets for public expression). 
 40. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980). 
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property and the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech,”41 
arguing that “common-law rights” were not “immune from revision 
by” the government.42 Thus, the crux of the issue is, and has always 
been, what substantive principles should govern the limitations on the 
property owner’s right to exclude. That is a question the Court seems 
loath to touch, using the forum metaphor and its concomitant 
reasonableness standard as reasons to defer largely to the judgment 
of the law school. 
Finally, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that property is simply a 
remarkably poor fit for the concepts that the Court is required to 
grapple with in this case. In one of its earlier cases dealing with the 
access of religious groups to university-sponsored fora, the Court 
openly acknowledged that the student organizations funding program 
“is a forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic 
sense.”43 The school’s right to control its actual physical property is at 
issue only to a very slight degree; CLS sought not just the use of 
school property—which it might have had in any case44—but also 
official recognition, funding, and the use of the school’s logo and 
various communications channels. But the “limited public forum” 
metaphor allowed the Court to avoid directly analyzing the actual 
burden on CLS’s freedom of speech and, perhaps more importantly, 
its freedom of association. It also allowed the Court to avoid 
determining whether that burden could be justified: the highly 
deferential standard that the Court was required to apply as a result 
of the limited public forum framework did not require any in-depth 
balancing of constitutional values. 
One might agree with Justice Stevens that Hastings’s policy is 
content- and viewpoint-neutral—even if one considers the specific 
policy prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation, rather 
than the broader accept-all-comers policy that the Court considered.45 
And one might persuasively argue that Hastings is permitted to apply 
such a condition to student groups, regardless of its effect on certain 
religious entities or its permissibility outside the context of official 
 
 41. Id. at 91 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 542 
(1976)). 
 42. Id. at 93. 
 43. Rosenberger v. Rector & Vistors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995). 
 44. CLS v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2991 (2010) (noting that Hastings offered CLS the use 
of its facilities for meetings and access to general bulletin boards). 
 45. Id. at 2995•96 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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university funding and recognition.46 But the majority did not make 
that argument; in fact, it avoided that issue altogether—turning CLS 
into a far-less-consequential case than many had expected. Indeed, 
this failure to say anything of real importance is perhaps the most 
surprising thing about the Court’s decision in CLS v. Martinez. 
 
 
 46. Id. at 2997•98. Of course, one might also take the position that antidiscrimination 
provisions may be applied constitutionally to government-funded programs outside the 
university setting. 
